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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- POLICE POWER- EQUAL PROTECTION - VOLUN-
TARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE STATUTE-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the Pennsylvania voluntary deviate sex-
ual intercourse statute is beyond the valid exercise of the state's police
power and is violative of the equal protection clauses of the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
In March, 1979, two "exotic" dancers, employed by an adult theater
featuring pornography, were arrested in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and
charged by information with voluntary deviate sexual intercourse, a
misdemeanor of the second degree.' The defendants appeared before
the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, and
filed a pre-trial motion to quash an information, which was granted. 2
The common pleas court held that the Pennsylvania voluntary deviate
sexual intercourse statute is unconstitutional on its face because it con-
stitutes an impermissible invasion of privacy.3 According to the court,
the statute violates the defendant's fundamental right of privacy
because there is no compelling state interest justifying interference
with an individual's sexual behavior as long as the behavior does not
involve unwilling participants.4 In addition, the court held that the
statute violates the equal protection clause of the United States Con-
stitution because the criminality of the conduct depends upon the ac-
tors' unmarried status.5 The court found no rational basis for such a
distinction and held that the marital status of voluntarily participating
1. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. at 91, 94, 415 A.2d 47, 49 (1980). 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3124 (Purdon 1973) provides: "A person who engages in deviate sexual inter-
course under circumstances not covered by section 3123 of this title (related to involun-
tary deviatesexual intercourse) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree." 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (Purdon 1973) provides in relevant part: "'Deviate sexual inter-
course.' Sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings who are not husband and
wife."
The theater's cashier (Bonadio) and manager were also arrested and charged with
criminal conspiracy. 490 Pa. at 101, 415 A.2d at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting). See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 903 (Purdon 1973).
2. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, No. CC7901507A (C.P. Allegh. County July 6, 1979),
affd, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
3. Id. at 5-6.
4. Id.
5. 1d at 2-3. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed the Supreme Court
stated that under the equal protection clause a classification must be reasonable, not ar-
bitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike. Id at 75-76.
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adults bears no logical relationship to the criminality of sexual
conduct.' The lower court concluded that if voluntary deviate sexual in-
tercourse constitutes a threat to the public interest and is abhorrent to
most people, it should be proscribed for all citizens, not for only un-
married citizens.7
The Commonwealth appealed8 to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
and allocatur was granted.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the court of common pleas on the grounds that the
voluntary deviate sexual intercourse statute exceeds the valid bounds
of the state's police power and violates the equal protection clauses of
the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions."
Writing for the majority," Justice Flaherty first noted that because
enforcement of the statute had been undertaken against them, the ap-
pellees had standing to assert that the statute impermissibly
discriminated against unmarried persons, of which class the appellees
were members. 2 The court stated that it did not need to determine
whether the appellees had standing to raise the right of privacy
because it based its decision solely on equal protection grounds.13
The court next addressed the Commonwealth's contention that the
statute was a valid exercise of the state's police power to regulate
health, safety, welfare, and morals. 4 The court noted that state police
power is not unlimited. To justify an exercise of state authority, the
state must show that the general public interest requires state inter-
ference and that the means are reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purpose, and are not unduly oppressive. 5
The majority declared that the state has a valid interest in protect-
ing the public from inadvertent exposure to offensive displays of sexual
6. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, No. CC7901507A, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Allegh. County
July 6, 1979).
7. Id
8. See Commonwealth v. Blevins, 453 Pa. 481, 309 A.2d 421 (1973) (state may ap-
peal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case where the question involved is purely one
of law).
9. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
10. Id. at 98, 415 A.2d at 51.
11. The court was divided 4-3. Chief Justice Eagen and Justices Larsen and Kauffman
joined in the majority opinion. Justices Roberts, O'Brien, and Nix dissented.
12. 490 Pa. at 94 n.2, 415 A.2d at 49 n.2. The Commonwealth argued that because
the lower court made no decision as to whether the statute as applied to the appellees
was constitutional, the case should be remanded for development of a fuli record of the
factual setting. The court, however, believed that the factual setting was set forth clearly
enough in the complaints and informations. Id
13. Id.
14. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49.
15. Id. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
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behavior, in protecting people from involuntary submission to sexual
contact, and in protecting minors from sexual abuse.16 The court deter-
mined, however, that the challenged statute serves none of these purposes,
nor does it promote a state interest in the institution of marriage. 7
The majority concluded that the only possible purpose of the statute is
regulation of the private conduct of consenting adults.' The court
pointed out that, according to the drafters of the Model Penal Code,
atypical sexual practices in private between consenting adults do not
harm the secular interests of the community.19
The majority next discussed the statute's violation of the equal pro-
tection clause. 0 The court stated that a classification which makes acts
criminal only when performed by unmarried persons is violative of the
equal protection clause where the differential treatment is not sup-
ported by a sufficient state interest.2' The court declared that to treat
similarly situated persons differently, the classification must be
reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.' The court pointed out that requiring a lower standard of
moral behavior for married persons than for unmarried persons is
without basis in logic.n
Convinced that the statute violated the constitutional right of equal
protection, Chief Justice Eagen, joined by Justices Larsen and Kauff-
man, concurred in the result.2 Justice Larsen wrote separately to
point out that all public sexual intercourse should be illegal, not only
that involving unmarried persons.5
16. 490 Pa. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49.
17. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49-50.
18. Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50. Relying on the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, the
court stated that the police power should protect the individual's right to be free from in-
terference in defining and pursuing his own morality, it should not enforce a majority
morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others. I& (quoting J. MILL, ON LERTY
(1859)).
19. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)).
20. 490 Pa. at 98, 415 A.2d at 50-51.
21. Id. Assuming, but not deciding, that no fundamental right was involved, see
note 49 infra, the court did not apply the strict scrutiny test to the classification. Id. See
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (fundamental right requires strict scrutiny).
22. 490 Pa. at 98, 415 A.2d at 50-51 (quoting Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-01,
314 A.2d 441, 443 (1975)).
23. 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51. The court rejected the Commonwealth's argument
that by excluding married persons' conduct from coverage, the statute furthered the state
interest in promoting the privacy inherent in the marital relationship. According to the
court, the marital status of voluntarily participating adults bears no rational relationship
to the criminality of a sexual act. Id. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (because
the "evil" in outlawing distribution of contraceptives is identical regardless of the marital
status of the parties, the marital classification was "invidious").
24. 490 Pa. at 100, 415 A.2d at 52. (Eagen, C.J., concurring).
25. Id. (Larsen, J., concurring).
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Justice Roberts, joined by Justice O'Brien, dissented. Because the
appellee's conduct had taken place before a public audience, he found
no basis upon which to invalidate the statute.28
Justice Nix dissented on the ground that the facts did not involve
private, intimate conduct between consenting adults.' He found it in-
credible that the majority could hold that the public display of "the
most depraved type of sexual behavior for pay" is beyond the state's
power to regulate public health, safety, welfare, and morals.28 Justice
Nix concluded that the majority's concern with the statute's marital
exception is misplaced because the exception relates to the intimacy of
a private marital sexual relationship. Here, the sexual acts were per-
formed in public and for pay. Thus, according to Justice Nix, the
marital status of the participants would not have affected their
culpability.29
A majority of states retain statutes proscribing private sodomous
acts between consenting adults.' Recently, however, a growing
number of jurisdictions have legislated to exclude these acts from the
purview of their criminal law." Additionally, the highest courts of
some states have held consensual sodomy statutes to be an unconstitu-
tional violation of the right of privacy, 2 a denial of equal protection,3
or to be void for vagueness.4
The court in Bonadio stated that it based its decision solely on equal
protection grounds.3 5 The court was constrained to so limit its rationale
because the challenged conduct was public, not private.3 1 If the majority
had based its decision on a right of privacy, it would have been ex-
26. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix declared that the majority's analysis of the
statute as unconstitutional on its face has been judicially sanctioned only in relation to
first amendment claims. Id. at 100 n.1, 415 A.2d at 52 n.1 (Nix, J., dissenting).
28. Id at 100, 415 A.2d at 52-53 (Nix, J., dissenting). Justice Nix assumed that the
majority's ruling would also put the regulation of prostitution and hard core pornography
beyond the state's control. Id. at 101, 415 A.2d at 53.
29. Id. at 102, 415 A.2d at 53.
30. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 13-1-110 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411,
-1412 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1972); IDAHO
CODE § 18-6605 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. § 21-3505 (1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.89
(West Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (Spec. Supp. 1975).
31. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288(a) (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-3-403 to 405 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-214 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 11-3 (Smith-Hurd 1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2603 (1977).
32. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 485, 415 N.E.2d 936, 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947,
949 (1980); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976).
33. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
34. See Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 302, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1974).
35. 490 Pa. at 94 n.2, 415 A.2d at 49 n.2.
36. Id. at 101, 415 A.2d at 52.
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amining the statute "on its face,"3 and such an examination is sanctioned
only where first amendment rights are involved.s
However, in holding that the statute is an invalid exercise of the
state's police power,31 the majority goes beyond the facts of the case.
In order for the state to validly exercise its police power, the general
public must benefit from such state interference, and the means may
not unduly oppress the individual.'0 Justice Flaherty characterized the
sole purpose of the challenged statute as being the regulation of
private consensual conduct, a purpose which exceeded the state's
police power.41 But Bonadio involved public, not private conduct.'
Therefore, although the majority declared that they would examine
the statute only as it applied to the appellees, they based their deci-
sion, in part, on a finding that the statute is an invalid regulation of
private conduct.
The majority could have examined the constitutionality of the
statute on its face if they had relaxed standing. The United States
Supreme Court has indicated that the rule requiring standing to attack
a statute's constitutionality is subject to exceptions. 3 One such excep-
tion is where the litigation would impair the constitutional rights of
one not a party to the action and such party has no effective way to
preserve those rights." Bonadio is such a situation because unmarried,
consenting adults who participate in private acts of sodomy are not, as
a practical matter, subject to prosecution. Therefore, these individuals
are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights.
37. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger the United States
Supreme Court defined a statute "unconstitutional on its face" as "flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause... and in whatever manner
and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it." Id. at 53-54 (quoting Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)).
38. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
39. 490 Pa. at 94 n.2, 415 A.2d at 49 n.2.
40. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
See also Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928) (the exercise of the police
power is valid only when the legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public
health, safety, welfare, and morals, or some other aspect of the general welfare).
41. 490 Pa. at 95, 415 A.2d at 50.
42. Id. at 101, 415 A.2d at 52.
43. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960). In Raines the Supreme Court stated
that standing is a rule of practice and as such is not inviolable. Weighty counterveiling
policies give rise to exceptions to such rules of practice. Id. at 22.
44. Id. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953). In both Eisenstadt and Barrows the Supreme Court relaxed standing and
allowed the litigant to raise the constitutional rights of a third party because of the impact of
the litigation on third party interests. 405 U.S. at 442; 346 U.S. at 259.
1981
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Because the court in Bonadio did not relax standing, it did not find a
right of privacy, and therefore it applied the rational relation test to
the statute's marital classification . 5 When a statute regulates only certain
classes of individuals without a reasonable basis for distinguishing the
classes and without evidencing a rational relationship to the fulfillment
of a legitimate state purpose, equal protection is offended. 6 In Bonadio
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the public did not benefit
from the prohibition of consensual sodomy for unmarried adults, and
that a distinction based on marital status did not bear a rational rela-
tionship to the fulfillment of a legitimate state purpose.' 7 The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's analysis is consistent with that employed by
the United States Supreme Court in cases which involve equal protec-
tion challenges to regulations which affect personal liberties. 8
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the extent of
the examination of a statute challenged on equal protection grounds
depends upon the nature and importance of the interest at stake.49 For
instance, when a statute concerning economic or social welfare, zoning,
45. 490 Pa. at 98, 415 A.2d at 51.
46. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). In Reed the Supreme Court stated:
The Equal Protection Clause does... deny to States the power to legislate that dif-
ferent treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Id (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). See also
McLaughlin v. Flordia, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (a classification must rest upon a dif-
ference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the state's purpose, and the
classification cannot be made arbitrarily).
47. 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51-52. Justice Flaherty pointed out that if the state
were seeking to prevent an evil, it should proscribe the conduct for married persons as
well. Id. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
48. The United States Supreme Court has never directly decided to what extent
the Constitution prohibits state regulation of private consensual sexual behavior among
adults. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977). The Supreme
Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affirmed without opinion a
district court's decision that a criminal sodomy statute was not unconstitutional as applied
to adult males engaged in private and consensual activity. See Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affjd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
49. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (statutory
scheme which impinges on individual interests and liberties is subject to a stricter stan-
dard of review than the rational basis test traditionally applied to economic legislation);
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (the substantiality of the interest which a state is required to
demonstrate in support of a challenged classification varies with the character of the
classification and the importance of the individual interests at stake). See generally 45
FoRD. L. REV. 553, 584 (1976).
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or local taxation is challenged on equal protection grounds, the Court
applies only a minimal rationality test to determine whether the
statute bears a rational relationship to the stated purpose.6 If any
state of facts reasonably can be perceived to justify discrimination in
the economic area, the statute will withstand an equal protection
challenge.5 1 However, when confronted with a statute that infringes
upon a significant personal liberty, the Court has shown a greater pro-
clivity to strike the classification on equal protection grounds. When
personal and not economic rights are involved, the Court applies a
heightened rational relationship analysis.2 Such an analysis was
employed by the Court in the seminal case of Eisenstadt v. Baird.53
There, a Massachusetts statute proscribed the distribution of con-
traceptives to married persons." The Court did not find that a fun-
50. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). In Boraas the Court
upheld a New York zoning ordinance against an equal protection challenge. The Court,
quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926), declared: "'If the validity of
the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judg-
ment must be allowed to control."' 416 U.S. at 4. The Court ilso stated: "We deal [here]
with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which
we respect against the charge of violation of the equal protection clause if the law be
,reasonable, not arbitrary' ... and bears 'a rational relationship to a permissible state ob-
jective."' I& at 8 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44-53 (1973) (a more restrained form of review than strict
scrutiny is appropriate when the "delicate and difficult questions" of local taxation, fiscal
planning, and educational policy are involved); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(declining to characterize Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws as being encompassed within
the first amendment, the Court stated that under the rational basis test, equal protection
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the state's objective); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a
Kansas statute dealing with the regulation of visual care on the ground that the four-
teenth amendment will not be used to strike down arguably unwise state laws which
regulate business and industry conditions); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)
(upholding a New York statute providing for minimum prices for milk on the ground that
the courts are incompetent and unauthorized to consider the wisdom or practicality of the
statute; a statute will not be invalidated unless it is "palpably in excess of legislative
power"). See generally 45 FORD. L. REV. 553, 584 (1976).
51. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
52. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) (broad
latitude is given state economic and social regulation, but the Court exercises a stricter
scrutiny when statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal
rights); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute allowing the
distribution of contraceptives to married persons but not to unmarried persons violated
the equal protection rights of the unmarried); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 519 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (regulation of the use of contraceptives touches upon a significant
personal liberty necessitating a more searching judicial inquiry). See generally 45 FORD. L.
REV. 553, 584 (1976).
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
54. Id at 440-41.
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damental interest was at stake nor did it find that unmarried persons
constitute a suspect class.', However, because the challenged statute
touched upon a liberty which is personal in nature, the Court employed
a more stringent rational relationship analysis to determine if the law
comported with the mandates of the equal protection clause.58
Ultimately, the Court determined that the classification did not bear a
rational relationship to any claimed state objective, hence, it was
declared violative of the equal protection clause. 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bonadio employed a similar
objective-by-objective analysis of the challenged statute. The Bonadio
court examined each of the state's claimed objectives of protecting the
public from indecent exposure, open lewdness, corruption of minors,
and of promoting the institution of marriage.8 The court concluded
that the marital status of voluntarily participating adults bore no ra-
tional relationship to the fulfillment of these objectives.59 Although the
court did not enunciate the test that it was applying, it correctly ap-
plied the heightened rational relationship analysis to the voluntary
deviate sexual intercourse statute because the statute infringed upon
the individuals' choice of sexual conduct, which entails a significant
personal liberty.6
The Bonadio majority reached the correct result, but, its analysis
was incomplete. If the majority had relaxed standing, it could have ad-
dressed the police power issue cogently, instead of in the oblique manner
which, given the public nature of the conduct, the majority was forced to
do. Further, the majority never articulated its application of the
heightened rational relation test that the United States Supreme Court
has applied in similar cases involving personal liberty. Inclusion of these
discussions would have resulted in a more authoritative opinion.
Louis Bader
55. Id. Similarly, the Bonadio court did not find a fundamental interest at stake nor
did the court determine that unmarried persons constitute a suspect class. 490 Pa. at 98,
415 A.2d at 51.
56. 405 U.S. at 448-52.
57. Id. at 454-55.
58. 490 Pa. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
59. Id at 95, 415 A.2d at 49-50.
60. Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 50. The court also held that marital status bore no rela-
tionship to whether a sexual act should be legal or criminal. Id at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
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